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PETRIE V. MICHETTI, AND THE INDELIBLE NATURE OF 
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS 
Morgan Romero∗ 
 Donations inter vivos are subject to a special set of rules in the 
Louisiana Civil Code, in addition to the law of conventional 
obligations.1 The grounds for revocation of donations have been 
the subject of extensive debate among Louisiana courts, civil law 
scholars, and attorneys. As this note will demonstrate through the 
lens of Petrie v. Michetti,2 a recent case decided by the Louisiana 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Louisiana law makes donations inter 
vivos irrevocable save exceptional circumstances where the law 
provides grounds for nullification in order to prevent obstructions 
that meddle with the free agency of the donation, and revocation 
on account of ingratitude.3 This case note considers the vices of 
duress and undue influence and revocation for ingratitude, and 
discusses how the jurisprudence has resolved these difficult issues 
when presented with challenging factual circumstances.4 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Maxine Rearick (Ms. Rearick) filed suit5 to revoke a 
donation of immovable property she had made to her daughter, 
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 1. Donations are governed by the provisions of Title II of Book III, 
whereas conventional obligations are addressed in Title IV. 
 2. Petrie v. Michetti, 10-122 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2011), 59 So. 3d 430. 
 3. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468. 
 4. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1478 (nullification due to fraud and duress), 
1479 (nullification due to undue influence), and 1556 (revocation for the 
donee’s ingratitude). 
 5. “Maxine Rearick died on May 21, 2010, during the course of the 
litigation. On August 26, 2010, Patricia Rearick Petrie, Joanne Rearick 
Belflower, and Linda Rearick Tillman, Ms. Rearick's daughters, were 
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Dixie Rearick Michetti (Ms. Michetti). Ms. Michetti was Ms. 
Rearick’s principal caregiver for five years. During this time, she 
lived with her mother on the property which was made the object 
of the donation.  
Several arguments transpired between Ms. Michetti and her 
sisters. One such argument caused Ms. Michetti to leave Ms. 
Rearick’s home for several weeks. Ms. Michetti told Ms. Rearick 
that “she would move out of the Cedar Avenue property if her 
mother did not donate the property to her because she could not 
afford to be a caregiver without assurances that she would not be 
forced to leave.”6 At trial, Ms. Rearick testified that she donated 
the property to Ms. Michetti because “she felt sorry for her.”7  
The evidence presented at trial revealed the tension in the 
relationships between mother and daughter, although the source of 
the discord was disputed. Ms. Rearick claimed that Ms. Michetti 
kicked a stool that her feet were resting on, placed a blood pressure 
monitor on her stomach against her will, and regulated her 
visitors.8 Ms. Rearick also contended that Ms. Michetti threatened 
to place her in a nursing home absent the donation.  
One of the sisters accused Ms. Michetti of raising her voice at 
Ms. Rearick. Ms. Michetti acknowledged that she sometimes had 
to speak loudly so that her mother could hear her. One of the 
sisters admitted calling Elderly Protective Services with 
complaints on nearly forty occasions. The Elderly Protective 
Services representative found that the allegations of abuse were 
“unsubstantiated.”9 Another one of Ms. Rearick’s daughters said 
that she never witnessed Ms. Michetti mistreat her mother. 
However, she admitted that she was angry when she learned of the 
                                                                                                             
 
substituted as parties appellants in the litigation.” Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 
432, n.1. 
 6. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 433. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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donation to her sister, and a fiery message that she left on her 
mother’s answering machine reflecting her resentment was played 
at trial.  
Ms. Rearick later admitted that for five years Ms. Michetti 
“applied for and picked up all her medicines, was a constant 
companion, sometimes cooked meals, bought groceries, helped her 
getting dressed, performed various household tasks, and took her 
to all of her hospital and doctor appointments.”10 The attorney who 
effected the donation testified that she observed no indications of 
duress. She stated that Ms. Rearick contemplated making the 
donation to Ms. Michetti multiple times during the few years 
preceding the act of donation. Ms. Rearick’s physician testified 
that he recalled no indications of abuse in the twenty-five years he 
had administered care to Ms. Rearick and that from Ms. Michetti, 
he had “seen only care and concern for [Ms. Rearick’s] well-being 
and comfort.”11 He described Ms. Rearick’s family relationships as 
“strained.”12 Michetti’s son-in-law also testified as to an absence 
of ill-treatment. 
Ms. Rearick claimed that her consent to the donation was a 
product of duress, rendering it a nullity and, in the alternative, that 
the court should revoke the donation due to her daughter’s 
ingratitude. The trial court denied Ms. Rearick’s petition, holding 
that she failed to prove duress and that she failed to prove that Ms. 
Michetti had been guilty of cruel treatment, crimes, or grievous 
injuries.13  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court, 
finding the donation valid after a de novo review of the duress 
claim and applying the manifest error, or clearly wrong standard, 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. at 434. 
 11. Id. at 435. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 440. 
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to the revocation for ingratitude claim.14 The court also mentioned 
the vice of undue influence, but dismissed it finding it was not 
present.15  
As to the claim of duress, the court applied the “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard.16 Based on the facts and testimony 
that the court deemed credible, the court concluded that the 
evidence was insufficient for a finding of duress.17 The court based 
its holding on Louisiana Civil Code article 1959.18 
The court recognized that Ms. Rearick relied “heavily on her 
testimony to the effect that Ms. Michetti threatened to place her in 
a nursing home if she did not donate the property to her.”19 
However, the court noted that Ms. Rearick also testified that she 
made the donation because she felt sorry for Ms. Michetti.20 With 
respect to the nursing home allegation, which Ms. Michetti denied, 
the court held that there was no evidence that the donation was a 
product of the threat.21 Ms. Michetti argued that her comment 
about having to move out if the property was not donated to her, 
since she needed guarantees that she would not be forced out of 
Ms. Rearick’s home, contemplated a lawful act.22 The court 
concluded that the nursing home allegation, even if proved, 
constituted a lawful act and thus could not be grounds for 
nullification due to duress.23  
With regard to plaintiff’s claim for revocation on account of 
ingratitude, the court held that the plaintiff had not carried her 
burden of proof. The court determined that the facts of the case, the 
lack of proof regarding Ms. Rearick’s accusations, and the trial 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id. at 439. (The trial court, in error, applied the Code articles on undue 
influence to the duress issue). 
 15. Id. 
 16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1483.  
 17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1478. 
 18. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1959. 
 19. Petrie, 59 So. 3d at 438. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 439.  
 23. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1962. 
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testimony supported a finding that “Ms. Michetti’s actions did not 
rise to the level of cruel treatment and grievous injury under La. 
C.C. art. 1557.”24  
III. COMMENTARY 
Louisiana’s strong policy to enforce parties’ contractual 
obligations is manifest in this case. In the exceptional cases where 
fraud, duress, undue influence, or the ingratitude of the donee can 
be proven by heightened evidentiary standards, the law provides 
access to the safeguards of nullification and revocation. Cases that 
involve challenging the validity of donations inter vivos are fact-
intensive and largely a matter of degree. These cases are especially 
difficult to resolve since the evidence is often purely 
circumstantial. The Petrie case reflects the courts’ robust 
reluctance to interfere with facially valid donations and 
demonstrates the difficulty of surmounting such high evidentiary 
standards.  
A. Duress 
The Petrie court relied primarily on Louisiana Civil Code 
Article 1959, finding no evidence creating “a reasonable fear of 
unjust or considerable injury to [Ms. Rearick’s] person, property, 
or reputation.”25 The courts found no evidence of “threats of 
imprisonment or great physical injury or death,” nor were such 
allegations made.26 The only purported threats were Ms. Michetti’s 
ultimatum to her mother about moving out and the comment about 
placing her in a nursing home. Moreover, the court found no causal 
connection between the supposed threat and the donation. Since 
consent to the act of donation is vitiated by duress, the duress has 
to have influenced the act. Ms. Rearick did not seem to be deprived 
                                                                                                             
 24. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 440, 441; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1557. 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1959. 
 26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1959 cmt.(b) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(Rev. 4th ed. 1968)). 
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of her liberty such that she was forced to submit to the donation. 
Finally, while Ms. Rearick suffered mild dementia, there was no 
evidence suggesting, nor did anyone argue, lack of capacity.27 The 
evidence as a whole tended to reveal Ms. Rearick’s unimpeded 
donative intent. 
The court also based its decision on the notion that threatening 
to do a lawful act cannot constitute legal duress.28 Moving out of a 
home and placing an older woman in a nursing home are both 
lawful acts. The court held that the alleged nursing home threat 
was entirely lawful.29 The Petrie court analogized the facts of the 
instant case to those of Guerin v. Guerin.30 In that case, the court 
held that a husband’s threat to leave his wife if she refused to sign 
an act of sale was “patently insufficient” to prove duress that 
would vitiate the wife’s consent.31 The court similarly found that 
Ms. Michetti’s ultimatum fell short of duress.32  
Duress is very difficult to prove. Ms. Rearick failed to establish 
that the donation was procured by duress by clear and convincing 
evidence.33 However, if the court had characterized Ms. Rearick’s 
donation as a remunerative donation, given in return for past 
services rendered, the evidentiary standard would have been 
merely a preponderance of the evidence.34 This is worth noting 
since the attorney who prepared the donation testified that Ms. 
Rearick told her that she wanted to donate the property because 
Ms. Michetti had been her caregiver for so long.35 However, the 
court deemed the donation gratuitous based on its findings 
regarding what prompted Ms. Rearick to make the donation.36 
                                                                                                             
 27. See, e.g., Rose v. Johnson, 940 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2006).  
 28. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1962. 
 29. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 439. 
 30. Id. at 438.  
 31. Guerin v. Guerin, 49 So. 2d 1053 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). 
 32. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 438. 
 33. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1483. 
 34. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1527. 
 35. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 434. 
 36. KATHYRN VENTURATOS LORIO, 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, 
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS §8.13 (West 2009) (stating that if “gratitude and 
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B. Revocation on Account of Ingratitude  
In holding that the plaintiff failed to prove Ms. Michetti’s 
ingratitude, the court relied on Louisiana Civil Code articles 1556 
and 1557. According to those provisions, two cases permit 
revocation of a donation inter vivos for the donee’s ingratitude: 
“[i]f the donee has attempted to take the life of the donor; or [i]f he 
has been guilty towards him of cruel treatment, crimes, or grievous 
injuries.”37 As to what constitutes the latter ground, Louisiana case 
law is sparse.38 Relying predominantly on the writings of French 
writers Aubry and Rau, courts generally state that “injuries include 
any act naturally offensive to the donor.”39 
In Porter v. Porter, for example, the Second Circuit upheld a 
donation where actions of the donees, including purposefully 
crashing into the donor’s vehicle, were provoked by the donor and 
were therefore justified defensive measures.40 As Porter 
demonstrates, the context of the actions is important. For example, 
Ms. Michetti hid Ms. Rearick’s medication, but the doctor said this 
was reasonable to ensure that Ms. Rearick did not exceed the 
proper dosage. Also, Ms. Michetti spoke in a loud tone to her 
mother because she had trouble hearing.  
Other cases illustrate that acts of ingratitude are often quite 
severe. In Erikson v. Feller, the Third Circuit revoked a donation 
of immovable property for ingratitude where the donee, grandson 
of the donor, accused the donor of molesting his child.41 The 
grandson’s molestation allegation was unsubstantiated. Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
 
love” rather than a desire to pay back influenced the donor, the donation should 
be deemed gratuitous and thus the rules for donations inter vivos apply.) It 
seems that the Petrie court adopted this view. 
 37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1557. 
 38. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 440 (citing Salassi v. Salassi, 08-510 
(La. App. 5 Cir. 2009) 13 So. 3d 670, 673). 
 39. Id. (citing 4 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS §708 
(La. State Law Institute Trans. Vol. 3, 1965)).  
 40. Porter v. Porter, 821 So. 2d 663 (La. App 2 Cir. 2002). 
 41. Erikson v. Feller, 889 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2004). 
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the grandson tried to evict his grandfather from the property over 
which the grandfather retained a usufruct. Similarly, in Sanders v. 
Sanders, the Second Circuit revoked a donation for ingratitude 
when the donee son told his father, the donor, that he wished his 
parents would die, wrote a letter slandering his parents, and 
renounced his father.42 Given the very limited circumstances in 
which Louisiana courts will revoke donations for the donee’s 
ingratitude, the evidence in Petrie was simply inadequate. 43  
C. Undue Influence and the Civil Law 
Louisiana Civil Code article 1479 states:  
A donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared 
null upon proof that it is the product of influence by the 
donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the 
donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other 
person for the volition of the donor.44  
Imported from the common law in 1991, the law of undue 
influence is fairly new in Louisiana. As a result, the scope of the 
doctrine and its place in Louisiana law is unclear. What is 
intriguing about Petrie v. Michetti is that the court dismissed undue 
influence very quickly. Ms. Rearick oddly did not plead it in her 
petition. In fact, “Ms. Rearick admitted that she ‘was not 
attempting to prove that she had lost her volition to [Ms. Michetti], 
but rather that she was indeed aware at the time of the donation 
that she was being coerced into the action.’”45  
Ms. Rearick’s reluctance to plead undue influence may be 
related to the fact that few such claims have been successful. The 
                                                                                                             
 42. Sanders v. Sanders, 768 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2000). 
 43. See also Perry v. Perry, 507 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1987) (revoking 
a donation by parents in favor of son after son had his parents’ property seized 
to satisfy a debt that they owed him, causing his parents much distress); Haydel 
v. Haydel, 2008-0245 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/31/08), 2008 WL 4763503 (revoking 
donations from a husband to a wife who, inter alia, questioned his masculinity, 
harassed him, called the police on him, and told him she did not love him; 
finding that these actions constituted cruel treatment and grievous injury). 
 44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479. 
 45. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 439. 
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difficulty in defining the scope of undue influence is partially due 
to its inherent subjectivity.46 Comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code 
article 1479, cited frequently by the courts, describes undue 
influence as being “of such a nature that it destroys the free agency 
of the donor.”47 Moreover, “mere advice or persuasion, or kindness 
and assistance, should not constitute influence that would destroy 
the free agency of a donor and substitute someone else’s volition 
for his own.”48 The evidence characteristic of undue influence 
cases is predominantly circumstantial. 
One of the few Louisiana cases holding a donation invalid due 
to undue influence is Succession of Sidney Lounsberry.49 In that 
case, Sidney Lounsberry died, leaving everything to a son who 
lived with him. The sons left with nothing sought to nullify the 
will, arguing that the son who inherited the estate exercised undue 
influence over their father, who was suffering from mental 
problems. The court held in favor of the plaintiff brothers, finding 
undue influence, and revoked the will.50 The court found that the 
son named in the will preyed upon his father’s weaknesses and 
encouraged his father’s irrational frustrations against his brothers. 
In Petrie, the facts do not reveal a hindrance on Ms. Rearick’s 
free agency. Especially in light of the attorney’s testimony and 
bolstered by the physician’s testimony, Ms. Rearick exhibited clear 
donative intent. Furthermore, Ms. Michetti is “a natural object of 
[Ms. Rearick’s] bounty” as the daughter who took care of her for 
years, and there is no evidence that Ms. Michetti caused her 
mother to harbor bitterness against her sisters.51  
                                                                                                             
 46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479, cmt.(b). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Succession of Sidney Lounsberry, 824 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
2002). 
 50. Id. 
 51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479, cmt.(b); See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue 
Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 41, 58 (2008-2009) (“the catalyst and strength of all undue influence 
cases is the perceived ‘unnaturalness’ of the testamentary disposition”); Cf. 
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Since the law of undue influence does not have its roots in the 
civil law and it is a rather new import, the courts delineate the 
meaning of the doctrine in practice. The Petrie court stated in dicta 
that it would not have found undue influence had it been properly 
raised.52 Nevertheless, since undue influence is a relative nullity 
and it was not pleaded, there was no opportunity for analysis, and 
thus clarification of the doctrine, in this case.  
                                                                                                             
 
Lounsberry, 824 So. 2d at 409 (revoking a donation finding that the donee 
exacerbated resentment on the part of his father (donor) against his brothers). 
 52. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 439. 
 
 
